

Policing  
Plan  
Targets  
and  
Measures

2013

Rationale and  
background  
information  
for measures

## INTRODUCTION

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This document proposes measures that have been developed to support delivery of the Policing Plan 2013-16. It provides the rationale for the priorities and the supporting measures which appear in the plan.

A summary of the proposed measures appears immediately below. Each measure is then presented in more detail, along with current (and past where available) performance information. The priorities and measures follow the same order as they appear in the policing plan.

### Summary of Measures

#### Protect the City of London from terrorism and extremism

CT Measure 1- To increase the number of engagements with the community aimed at deterring people supporting terrorism or violent extremism

CT measure 2 - To ensure all relevant plans for business development within the City of London are subject to consultation and scrutiny by the Counter Terrorism Architectural Liaison team

CT Measure 3- To deploy intelligence led, high visibility policing operations to counter the terrorism threat and to reassure the public

CT Measure 4 -To ensure that at least 90% of people surveyed consider the City of London Police is prepared and capable of policing the terrorist threat effectively

#### Protect the City of London and UK from fraud

EC Measure 1-To increase the number of government and industry sectors providing economic crime data to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau

EC Measure 2 -To increase quantity and quality of fraud prevention products disseminated by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau

EC Measure 3- To disrupt the top 10 organised crime groups causing the greatest harm.

EC Measure 4 -To ensure that at least 90% of fraud victims are satisfied with the service provided

EC Measure 5- To increase by 10% the number of police officers, public sector and private sector fraud investigators trained by the Fraud Academy.

EC Measure 6-To conduct reviews of investigations, to inform Fraud Academy training courses and best practice toolkits.

### **Respond effectively to public disorder**

PO Measure 1- To meet all national requirements for public order mobilisation in support of the Strategic Policing Requirement

PO Measure 2- To deliver ongoing organisational improvements and development relating to public order deployments

PO Measure 3 - To ensure at that least 85% of residents and businesses are satisfied with the information received in relation to pre-planned events

### **Reducing crime**

CR Measure 1- To reduce levels of victim-based violent crime compared to 2012-13

CR Measure 2- To reduce levels of victim-based acquisitive crime compared to 2012-13

### **Improve road safety**

RP Measure 1- To support the City of London Corporation's casualty reduction target through enforcement and education activities

RP Measure 2- To increase the number of uninsured vehicles seized and unlicensed drivers apprehended compared to 2012-13

RP Measure 3 - To increase the number of referrals to the Safer Cycle Scheme and the Driver Alert Scheme compared to 2012-13

### **Antisocial Behaviour**

ASB Measure 1- To ensure that at least 90% of those reporting antisocial behaviour are satisfied with the way the police handled their case.

ASB Measure 2- To reduce the average annual number of rough sleepers in the City of London

ASB Measure 3- To actively promote, with partners, effective stewardship and crime prevention activities within licensed premises

ASB Measure 4 - To run intelligence led operations to target threats associated with the night time economy

### **Satisfaction and Response**

To ensure at least 85% of the City's street population surveyed consider the police in the City of London are doing a good or excellent job

To respond to at least 95% of 999 calls within the national target time of 12 minutes

## Priority – Counter Terrorism

### Reason for priority

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- 1.1 The Strategic Assessment (SA) notes that although whilst the threat from international terrorism appears to have reduced, as with the threat from domestic extremism, the City of London remains a primary target from both Irish and international terrorism. This is principally due to its reputation as one of the world's foremost financial hubs and its importance nationally and globally in financial and cultural terms. The threat level for the UK remains at Substantial (having reduced from Severe in July 2011), indicating there remains a strong possibility of an attack.
- 1.2 The central message from the SA is that the threat from terrorism in an environment like the City is such that the protection of the City has to remain one of the Force's principal priorities. It also ensures that the Force is addressing its obligations in this area to support the Strategic Policing Requirement.
- 1.3 Last year, the principal CT measure centred on maintaining "Ring of Steel" patrols at a level commensurate with threat levels. That target has not been continued for 2013 onwards, although the information will still be collated, monitored and reported to PMG. A commitment to the Ring of Steel will be articulated within the text of the policing plan. The measures that are proposed do, however, cover the breadth of CT activities and focus on the Prevent Strategy, the future proofing the City against attack, the business community and the wider community's confidence that the Force is prepared and capable of dealing effectively with a terrorist or major incident.

#### **CT Measure 1 – To increase the number of engagements with the community aimed at deterring people supporting terrorism or violent extremism**

- 1.4 **Reason:** Prevent is a key pillar of the Government's Counter Terrorism strategy (Contest). It seeks to highlight those people who are vulnerable to or are on the path towards violent extremism. Through national Prevent arrangements a referral process is in place to provide assistance to such people. A Prevent engagement is defined nationally as an interaction with individuals, groups or institutions where the Prevent agenda is specifically briefed or discussed. Examples of engagements include: - a Prevent stand at university Freshers' week highlighting the Prevent agenda; presentations to youth clubs regarding Prevent; interaction with company HR and IT departments about Prevent and methods of reporting suspicious behaviour.
- 1.5 **Baseline Information:** CoLP delivered 49 events that fulfilled the criteria for Prevent engagements during 2012 (1st January to 29th November 2012). These involved residential, business and student communities. A target of 4 engagements per month represents a challenging increase on last year's performance but is realistic as our Prevent capability and network of engagement increases. No data was recorded prior to 2012.

1.6 **How it will be measured/reported:** All engagements are reported to the Prevent coordinator. These are recorded and reported to the National Prevent Delivery Unit (NPDU) on a quarterly basis. Engagements are undertaken by Prevent staff within SB and also designated staff within Wards policing. Data will be supplied monthly to PMG by the CT department.

**CT Measure 2 – To ensure all relevant plans for business development within the City of London are subject to consultation and scrutiny by the Counter Terrorism Architectural Liaison team**

1.7 **Reason:** This measure is carried forward from 2012-13. It supports a key area of prevention work in counter terrorism. The term '*design out crime and terrorism*' is a well recognised one that is used by the Force and its partners and is generally well understood. 'Designing out' vulnerabilities from terrorism, extremism and crime are part of CT's core business and reflect the responsibilities of the Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA) and the Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO) team. It assists in future proofing the City against attack. An additional element is being introduced, which is to develop a mechanism for assessing the impact of the feedback provided by the Force. That information will be collated over the course of the year with a view to setting a target based on quality/satisfaction at the next target review.

1.8 The word *relevant* is included to reflect the fact that the Barbican, for example, is a Grade 2 listed building and minor structural and cosmetic changes require the submission of a plan. The Force would not comment on these in the normal course of business. However, criteria are formally established confirming that the Force will scrutinise all development plans for new builds and major refurbishments.

1.9 "Relevant" applications that are referred for ALO consultation are:

- Office and commercial developments
- Housing developments
- Major retail and leisure developments (not individual units within existing premises)
- Public open space or landscaping
- Other developments as from time to time agreed between the Planning Department and the ALO

1.10 **Baseline Information:** The City of London Corporation's Planning Department identifies relevant applications and the ALO reviews each one. During 2011 (current year's data is overleaf) it reviewed all 46 relevant applications. Many of these are lengthy and can result in planning conditions being proposed through formal statements by the ALO. It is a complex, multi stakeholder process, not merely a paper review.

**Current position (Financial year to date)**

Month	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct
YTD Total consultation given	4	7	11	15	19	22	23
<b>Traffic Light</b>	<b>Green</b>	<b>Green</b>	<b>Green</b>	<b>Green</b>	<b>Green</b>	<b>Green</b>	<b>Green</b>
Development Plans submitted within month	4	3	4	4	4	3	1
Reviewed Plans (no advice required)	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Reviewed Plans (written advice provided)	4	3	4	4	3	2	1
<b>Trend</b>	→	↑	↑	→	↑	↑	→

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1.11 **How it will be measured:** the table above illustrates how the information will be reported to PMG. Data will be supplied monthly by CT.

**CT measure 3 – To deploy intelligence led, high visibility policing operations to counter the terrorism threat and to reassure the public**

1.12 **Reason:** The Government’s Counter Terrorism strategy, ‘CONTEST’, tackles the terrorist threat through various strands, the ‘Protect’ element strengthening our protection against terrorist attacks in the UK and reducing vulnerability. The Threat level remains at Substantial, indicating a strong possibility of an attack and the Force Strategic Assessment demonstrates that the City of London still remains a primary target from both Irish and International terrorism. The unique environment of the City and its high concentration of critical and iconic sites makes it an attractive target for terrorists and the nature of the threat is diversifying, often in response to events across the world. Our continued intelligence led approach to daily high visibility policing deployments is key to protecting the City of London. City of London Police will continue to work with our partners to assess the level and nature of threat posed and will analyse the results of our tactical deployments and resultant intelligence. Key activity will continue to be taken in relation to intelligence and enforcement and this particular protective activity aims to detect, deter and disrupt those individuals, who may be motivated by extreme ideologies, intent on causing harm to others.

1.13 Historically the Force has used a six weekly Counter Terrorism tasking and coordination process which has considered the most recent Intelligence and information to inform the timing, location and nature of the tactics to be deployed. Intelligence from partner agencies, analysis of Operation Lightning (Hostile Reconnaissance) reports, forthcoming events and the overall level and nature of the

terrorist threat are among the factors considered in determining the policing response to mitigate the threat. Tactics include a broad range of options including;

- Control Room activity utilising the CCTV and Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology around the City in order to identify any suspicious behaviour and coordinate an appropriate and proportionate policing response.
  - Directed Patrols, both armed and unarmed, and in vehicles and on foot, focused around iconic, vulnerable, and critical sites.
  - 'Entry Point' Policing, targeting vehicles entering the City of London through the 'Ring of Steel',
  - Uniformed patrols, delivering Ct patrols directed to specific locations including crowded places
- 1.14 All staff and officers employed in these bespoke Counter Terrorism tactics are briefed in advance regarding the current threat picture and intelligence and the tactical delivery of these options is reviewed daily through the Daily Management Meeting and can be refined in response to new intelligence or local incidents.
- 1.15 2013 sees the introduction of a more holistic approach to tasking and coordination within the City of London police and Counter Terrorism taskings will be considered as part of a single Force process as opposed having a separate mechanism. This will allow a more effective use of resources and the governance of the Daily Management Meeting will remain and will allow tactics to be revised in response to any emerging intelligence or information.
- 1.16 The use of specially trained Behavioural Detection Officers as part of a bespoke high visibility policing deployment is a new concept being introduced by the City of London Police. These tactics are designed to identify suspicious behaviour by creating an environment (that raises the anxieties of those worried about being detected because they are criminals or have criminal intent. Behavioural Detection Officers (BDOs) are trained to firstly establish what is normal for their environment and then look for deviations from this baseline.
- 1.17 Training also includes an emphasis on specific behaviours often displayed by attackers; those engaged in hostile reconnaissance and general suspicious behaviour indicators. Finally, it addresses a new approach to resolving concerns about identified individuals through a rapport-based elicitation of information. The Force has recently carried out a three-week trial of BDO activity and it is anticipated that this will form part of business as usual from next year.
- 1.18 This new approach involves a more effective and strategic co-ordination of existing CoLP resources to deter and detect hostile reconnaissance. This tactic aims to not only deter the selection of the City as a terrorist target, but also result in a reduction in wider crime and allows for a more flexible and variable approach.

- 1.19 **Baseline Information:** The current minimum level of dedicated, Counter Terrorism deployments comprises eight Entry Points policed three times each throughout the day, dedicated high visibility patrols in specific geographical areas including iconic and critical sites as well as the vicinity of rail stations and crowded /night time economy venues.
- 1.20 The Force Tactical Firearms Group is required to deliver at least 90% of its deployment time on a combination of armed vehicle and foot patrols and CCTV/ANPR operators within the Force Command & Control Centre also have a commitment to counter terrorism. These deployments are recorded on the Force Sharepoint system, as are the numbers of intelligence reports generated, the number of people and vehicles stopped, searched and the outcome of these interactions.
- 1.21 The use of BDO operations has been found to produce a higher success rate than traditional policing methods. Various studies, carried out in London with both police and civilian screening staff, consistently show that about 25% of BDO stops lead to an outcome such as an arrest or caution. Traditional methods typically generate less than 5% positive outcomes. During the three week trial of BDO operations within the City of London during December 2012 a success rate of around 25% was achieved and this figure is proposed as a target for BDO operations.
- 1.22 **How it will be measured/ reported:** The number and nature of deployments will be reported monthly to PMG and measured against the minimum number of operations tasked. UPD will continue to record the level of high visibility CT specific policing activity on Sharepoint .
- 1.23 Early indications are that the BDO trial has shown significant successes and is likely to be recommended as being adopted as a regular uniformed policing tactic. The measure of successful outcomes against the 25% target represents a qualitative measure that has, until now, been absent.
- 1.24 The BDO trial included a comprehensive corporate communications package and the capture of feedback from members of the public. These showed that the majority of people who were asked found the tactic reassuring. It is proposed that future similar surveys will be carried out and the use of trained tactical engagement officers on these operations will proactively seek feedback from the public. Corporate Communications department will conduct periodic media campaigns and feedback will be collated.
- 1.25 All of the above will be coordinated under the direction of Supt UPD, responsible for the tactical delivery. All related intelligence reports will be assessed by Special Branch / Counter Terrorism Section to ensure compliance with local and national CT Operations (Operation Lightning, hostile reconnaissance; Operation Trammel, use of forged/false documents to facilitate terrorism, and Operation Camion, the terrorist use of liveried vehicles). All intelligence gained will be assessed and appropriately investigated. The Supt CT will coordinate the latter and both areas



will report to PMG and will also be subject of a higher-level quarterly report to Police Committee.

**CT measure 4 – To ensure that at least 90% of people surveyed consider the City of London Police is prepared and capable of policing the terrorist threat effectively**

- 1.26 **Reason:** For 2012-13 the Force adopted a similar target, which focused on attendees at Griffin<sup>1</sup> and Argus<sup>2</sup> events. The Force performed well against that target, and it is proposed to continue with a qualitative measure that focuses on a broader audience. Both Argus and Griffin are key elements of the Force's overall aim to reduce the risk from terrorism. Feedback from both events is crucial to improving how the Force performs in this area and consequently how confident the City's community is in the Force's ability to deal with a terrorist or major incident.
- 1.27 To be able to gauge the extent to which the Force is succeeding in demonstrating its preparedness to deal with a terrorist incident, it is proposed to introduce a new target that assesses confidence in the wider community and not just those who have received an Argus or Griffin briefing or have just attended a specific event. This measure will highlight what work needs to be done to ensure that the community feels reassured that the Force is capable and prepared to deal with the threat from terrorism
- 1.28 **Baseline Information:** Baseline 2011-12: There were on average 12 Griffin events per year, although for 2012-13 this was reduced to 8 due to Olympic and Paralympic Games commitments. Argus events usually averaged around 30 per year. With regard to Griffin events, over the course of 2011-12, the Force recorded an average level of 97% of people expressing confidence in the City of London Police's capability to deal effectively with a terrorist or major incident. Last year's target was of 85% of delegates confident in the Force's ability to deal with a terrorist or major incident due to the inclusion of Argus events in the measure, which had not previously been benchmarked and its impact on Griffin performance had not been assessed at that time. 90% is therefore considered to incorporate an element of stretch.

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<sup>1</sup> **Project Griffin** is an internationally renowned partnership project that brings together the Police and private security guards to provide awareness and protective security to prevent and prepare for the consequences of terrorist incidents. It is widely accepted as good practice and has recently been adopted nationally by the National Counter Terrorism and Security Office (NaCTSO). It is a key tactic in the Force's objective of keeping the City safe from terrorism

<sup>2</sup> **Project Argus (Area Reinforcement Gained Using Scenarios)** is a NaCTSO initiative which aims to help businesses to prevent, prepare for, handle and recover from a terrorist attack.

### ARGUS BASELINE INFORMATION

Month	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov
Month Achievement	No data	No data	93%	97.6%	-	98%	100%	95.5%
Traffic Light	-	-	Green	Green	-	Green	Green	Green
# Argus Seminars	3	2	7	5	0	2	2	2
Percentage Change	-	-	N/A	4.6%	-	0.4%	2%	-4.5%
Trend	-	-	N/A	↑	-	↑	↑	↓
YTD Average	-	-	93%	95.3%	-	96.2%	97.15%	96.82%

### GRIFFIN BASELINE INFORMATION

Month	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov
Month Achievement	99%	99%	-	96%	-	-	96%	95%
Traffic Light	Green	Green	Green	Green	-	-	Green	Green
# Griffin Seminars	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
Percentage Change	N/A	0	-	-3%	-	-	0	-1%
Trend	N/A	→	-	↓	-	-	→	↓
YTD Average	99%	99%	-	98%	-	-	97.5%	97%

**BASELINE INFORMATION, GENERAL SURVEY RESULTS:** Data supplied by PIU.

On a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0 is not at all confident and 10 is completely confident), how confident are you that City of London Police can effectively police Counter Terrorism?

Rating	Q3 2011/12	Q4 2011/12	Q1 2012/13	Q2 2012/13	Total	Percentage
0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%
1	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%
2	1	1	0	0	2	0.3%
3	1	0	0	1	2	0.3%
4	0	0	2	1	3	0.5%
5	12	4	7	5	28	4.7%
6	8	18	4	7	37	6.2%
7	22	22	17	13	74	12.3%
8	45	50	70	52	217	36.2%
9	31	22	39	49	141	23.5%
10	21	32	21	22	96	16.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

7+	84%	85%	92%	91%	88%
8+	69%	70%	81%	82%	76%

- 1.29 The above table shows the current percentages of people's levels of confidence that the Force can effectively police counter terrorism. The proposed target has been set based on those that record a level of 7+ (based on 0=no confidence and 10=completely confident)
- 1.30 **How it will be measured/reported:** Data will be supplied by PIU based on questions asked in quarterly surveys. It will, therefore, be reported to PMG quarterly. Projects Griffin & Argus will continue to utilise feedback sheets, although for 2012. The CT section is developing a mechanism to capture levels of satisfaction in relation to engagement with the business community. Currently much of this is not captured and feedback is informal or a personal basis. All performance from the CT section will be submitted to PMG.

## 2 Priority – Economic Crime

### Reason for priority

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- 2.1 The Strategic Assessment states explicitly that the threat to the UK from economic crime is serious and becoming increasingly complex. In 2012 the National Fraud Authority published the annual fraud indicator estimating the cost of fraud to the UK economy to be the region of £73bn. For an environment such as the City of London reputational damage can result in direct financial loss, which impacts on the confidence in the 'UK plc'.
- 2.2 Fraudsters use increasingly complex methods and the latest, sometimes emerging, technologies to commit their crimes. Unlike other "traditional criminality" therefore, those committing frauds are not limited by physical proximity to their victims. It also means such criminality can be extremely difficult to detect and disrupt.
- 2.3 Given the amount of money at risk from economic crime it is not surprising that highly organised crime groups play an expanding and diversifying role in economic crime. Technological innovations which seek to improve customers' experience of banking or transacting money provides new opportunities for such groups to exploit weaknesses.
- 2.4 Protecting the City of London and the UK from the risk posed by economic crime has to be a fundamental priority for the Force. Given the Force's national role in combating fraud, the additional funding it receives for this and the expectations that are an inherent part of that, has to affirm that position.

### **EC Measure 1 – To increase the number of government and industry sectors providing economic crime data to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau**

- 2.5 **Reason:** NFIB's *KnowFraud* database is already the primary source of intelligence for the UK's National Strategic Assessment. However, there are a number of significant gaps in existing data including insurance and tax fraud. Increasing the pool of

organisations providing crime data to the NFIB will improve the accuracy and validity of strategic products supplied by the NFIB.

2.6 **Baseline information:** The NFIB currently has 32 data feeds which cover the following 12 sectors:

- Police / law enforcement
- Retail
- Banking (payments)
- Asset Finance
- Company Registration and Regulation
- Land Registry
- NHS
- Postal
- Telecommunications
- Trading Regulators
- Vehicle Trading
- Travel industry

2.7 **How it will be measured/reported:** This information will be supplied quarterly by the National Fraud Capability Project Team.

**EC Measure 2 – To increase quantity and quality of fraud prevention products disseminated by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau**

2.8 **Reason:** Disrupting fraud enablers is the most cost effective means of reducing the financial harm caused by fraud. Such enablers include bank accounts used to accept stolen money, e-mail addresses used by fraudsters and bogus websites that promote fictitious investment products. Although there is a disparity between the financial values of fraud prevented by disrupting different types of enablers, it is an aspiration of the National Lead Force (NLF) to ‘industrialise’ the disruption process; more individual activities will correlate with greater amounts of fraud disrupted.

2.9 **Baseline Information:**

Quantity (Volumetric)

Figure based upon the average volume over the first three quarters – the average has been used as a projected volume for Q4)

Baselines: Number of alerts disseminated in 2012/2013 = 1026.

Number of intelligence disseminations in 2012/2013 = Intelligence Summaries = 756, Initial Profiles = 79, Analytical Products = 43. TOTAL Intelligence disseminations = 878

Number of disruption requests 2012/2013 (websites, phones, bank accounts)

Websites = 498, Phones = 329, Bank Accounts = 394, TOTAL Tech Disruptions = 1221

Total = 3125 (to be divided between 12 (calendar months)

Quantitative (survey based)

This will be measured by ‘Survey Monkey’ responses: increasing the number instances where the alert has a positive action. A positive action is when one or more of the following are selected:

- An alert or warning action is sent out to their customers/stakeholders/community
- Suspension or removal of an account or other exploitable facility
- Enforcement action (Civil or Criminal)
- Change in policy / strategy and in their business

Baseline is 90% (based on a survey of 32 respondents)

Please note only 6 months data was available so baseline is data x2.

- 2.10 **How it will be measured/reported:** The NFIB will supply this information to the National Fraud Capability Project Team on a monthly basis.

**EC Measure 3 – To disrupt the top 10 Fraud organised crime groups causing the greatest harm.**

- 2.11 **Reason:** Disrupting fraud Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) has the potential to positively impact on the lives of a huge number of potential crime victims (e.g. Boiler Rooms). OCGs also have the greatest financial impact on the UK and rightly deserve prioritising in the enforcement matrix. It is imperative that the disruption of an OCGs capability is correctly assessed, ratified and recorded by the City of London Police. The Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM) meeting chaired by the Director of Intelligence will have overview of the OCGs and ensure that Law Enforcement Activity is conducted against those which pose the greatest threat, risk and harm. It will also ensure that ownership of the OCG investigation is allocated to a Lead Responsible Officer (LRO) with an agreed action plan to ensure activity, accountability and disruption opportunities are maximised.

- 2.12 **Baseline Information:** City owned OCG data is collected and coordinated by the Force Intelligence Bureau which records all OCG data for the force. This information will be utilised to inform and assist the OCGM. It will also be aggregated into the National picture for OCGs. This process will ensure that activity is directed against the top 10 City owned OCGs and that disruptions are properly assessed, so that results are transparent and ethical. Finally this meeting will document activity against all of the CoLP OCGs along with any disruptions against them, so that a summary of the total disruptions conducted during the year can be documented.

- 2.13 **How it will be measured/reported:** A disruption against an OCG will only be recorded where law enforcement activity has disrupted the OCGs capability and will be evidenced by the submission of a disruption document by the LRO to the OCGM. The OCGM panel will assess the disruption, ratifying that a disruption can be claimed. The OCGM will be conducted on monthly bases to ensure that activity is being conducted against the OCGs, which pose the greatest threat, risk and harm (Top Ten) along with an action plan and LRO being allocated. This process will ensure that FIB will be able to evidence both disruptions against the top 10 City owned OCGs and a summary of all disruptions against the force total OCGs. This will be a monthly report to PMG.

**EC Measure 4 – To ensure that at least 90% of fraud victims are satisfied with the service provided**

- 2.14 **Reason:** Fraud victims have historically received a poor service from the police – the primary reason for the government’s Fraud Review in 2008. The Force has achieved year-on-year improvements in victim satisfaction levels - an ambition of the Lead Force programme is to maintain these levels at or above those for other crime types.
- 2.15 **Baseline Information:** The latest survey data demonstrates a satisfaction level of 89%. 90% has been set to include an element of stretch for the coming year.
- 2.16 **How it will be measured/reported:** Data will be collated quarterly by the National Fraud Capability Team who maintain a separate contract with the Force’s survey company, *SPA Future Thinking*. However, for the purposes of efficiency and cost, it is intended these two pieces of work will be merged during 2013/14.

**EC Measure 5 – To increase by 10% the number of police officers, public and private sector investigators trained by the Fraud Academy.**

- 2.17 **Reason:** High quality investigations improve detection rates and victim satisfaction. This is a core aspiration of National Lead Force – particularly as a good deal of specialist expertise has been lost from the police service over the past decade. Training police, government and private sector investigators to a national standard (Fraud Investigators Handbook) is a key means of achieving this; it also follows the model employed for other specialist areas such as homicide.
- 2.18 **Baseline Information:** 531 delegates trained during 2012/13.
- How it will be measured/reported:** To be reported monthly: Fraud Academy staff will provide their monthly course manifests to the National Fraud Capability Team.

**EC Measure 6 – To review fraud investigations to inform Fraud Academy training courses and best practice toolkits.**

- 2.19 **Reason:** The quality and relevance of fraud training rests on continually refreshing investigators’ knowledge of the means by which fraud is committed and any new / more effective ways of evidence gathering. It is therefore critical that training modules delivered by the Fraud Academy exploit the learning and experience of Lead Force investigations.
- 2.20 **Baseline Information:** This target does not rely on a baseline being set. Rather, it is concerned with compliance with an absolute standard (a comparison being the

Victims' Charter that compels investigators to update crime victims every calendar month).

- 2.21 **How it will be measured/ reported:** The National Fraud Capability Project Team will collect this information on a monthly basis - using the UNIFI system to identify which cases have been 'put away' and therefore require a review to be conducted.

### 3 Priority – Public Order

#### Reason for priority

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- 3.1 Public order is addressed in detail at two distinct points within the Force’s Strategic Assessment (SA): firstly, it is covered in its own right with respect to large scale events<sup>3</sup>; secondly, it is examined in relation to the threat to public order posed by domestic extremism<sup>4</sup>.
- 3.2 Concerning the first category, the threat posed by a number of groups such as Occupy London, Occupy LSX and others is examined in terms of their activities and the continued attractiveness of the City of London as a target for such groups. The SA makes the important point that over the past year the nature of protests taking part in the City of London is growing in scale and in levels of violence. Concerning the second category of domestic extremism; the SA highlights the threat posed by animal rights protesters, environmental and political activists and other single issue groups.
- 3.3 The SA does not refer to the number of high profile events that take place in the City and which are important from a public order perspective (Lord Mayor’s Show, Mansion House/Guildhall event, presence of Royalty and so on) but such events need to be policed sensitively and, like the City environment generally, are attractive targets for protest groups to disrupt and receive extensive media coverage.
- 3.4 To ensure that the City of London remains a safe and peaceful area, to mitigate the adverse impact of media coverage should an event or protest go awry, and to support effectively the Strategic Policing Requirement, as with economic crime and counter terrorism, there is a strong argument for retaining public order as a key Force priority.

#### **Public Order Measure 1 – Meet all national requirements for public order mobilisation in support of the Strategic Policing Requirement**

- 3.5 **Reason:** To protect the City effectively the Force requires that a number of suitably trained and equipped officers can be deployed to deal with public order incidents, at a variety of levels: this can range from local specialist support around ‘night time economy’ venues to large-scale pan-London events. Last year, this target was focussed on supporting the Olympic and Paralympic Games, together with events organised to celebrate the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee, none of which will impact on 2013-14. However, the Force’s ability to meet national mobilisation requirements is considered an important area, especially in view of the fact the Force must support national mobilisation requirements under the Strategic Policing Requirement. Adopting this measure will ensure that the Force maintains adequate cover in the event it is called upon to provide assistance, and will provide reassurance to the City’s community that

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<sup>3</sup> Strategic Assessment 7.9 pg 38

<sup>4</sup> Strategic Assessment 8.1.7 et seq. pg 47



there are sufficient levels of suitable trained/equipped officers to deal with more local incidents.

- 3.6 **Baseline Information:** The Force is required to be able to deploy 3 Police Support Units (PSU) under the Strategic Policing Requirement. A PSU consists of 1 Inspector, 3 Sergeants and 21 Constables. The First PSU must be mobilised within 4 hours then a further two PSU's within 24 hours. The 'Learmouth' formula has been looked at nationally, which calculates the number of PSU's required, as a percentage of the force establishment. This would see a reduction to a requirement in requirement down to 2 PSU's if these proposals were accepted. The City of London Police clearly needs to be in a position to be able to release sufficient resources as part of the national mobilisation plan, whilst being in a position to deal with the threat of harm within our own force boundaries. The Force currently plans for over 1000 events per annum, 40 of which are classified as major or significant, comprising major ceremonial operations, state banquets public protest and crime in action operations. There were 6 mutual aid requests, during the last year including the Olympics and 26 Benbow operations (*The Benbow protocol is a formal arrangement between the three principal police forces in London: the MPS CoLP and BTP, to facilitate a coordinated and effective policing response to pre-planned and spontaneous public order events, and to other major events which are cross border or may have an impact on the policing of another force area*).
- 3.7 The Force currently has 78 level 2 trained Officers and 35 trained to level 1 public order standard, this provides the requisite resources for national mobilisation whilst leaving sufficient assets for a complete PSU to remain in force. In addition the Force currently has six public order Cadre trained command officers who are deployed under the Benbow protocol.
- 3.8 **How it will be measured:** Records are maintained by the Force Operational planning team which details each requirement for resources along with our subsequent response. Ongoing training of our level 1 and 2 Officers, along with succession planning responsibility, currently sits with the Chief Inspector Uniformed Policing (Support). Numbers are reviewed quarterly and reported through the public order forum in order that sufficient numbers are retained and trained to the requisite standard.

#### **Public Order Measure 2 – to deliver ongoing organisational improvement and development relating to public order deployments**

- 3.9 **Reason:** The Force currently enjoys a relatively low number of public complaints against officers (roughly 100 per year). There is, however, a potential vulnerability around civil claims made against the Force, and whilst these are relatively low, the MPS has seen a rising number of litigants appearing post event and protest, who often challenge the interpretation of public order legislation. G20 and the subsequent Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) investigation stands as a reminder of the impact of the application of public order tactics and its perception in the public

domain. As a result there has been a dramatic shift in how the police service views and deals with protest, considering all citizens' rights, particularly under articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Human Rights Act (Freedoms of thought conscience and religion/ freedoms of expression and freedoms of assembly). Our approach to public order policing must be in line with the observations of the IPCC report and the HMIC paper: "Adapting to Protest" The Force already has a strong and effective mechanism for dealing with organisational learning, it is anticipated that the bulk of organisational development and improvement should be delivered under existing governance arrangement.

- 3.10 **Baseline information:** There is no existing baseline for this proposed measure.
- 3.11 **How it will be measured/reported:** Supplied to PMG monthly will be the number of events and the number of debriefs. The de-briefs should consider as a minimum: the planning and initial resourcing of the event (including the command team); information and intelligence; briefing issues; resource allocation (considering partner agencies and external stakeholders); threat assessment and mitigation of known risks, identification of training issues and resilience. The measure of success with respect to organisational learning will be a consequent reduction in numbers of complaints or actions taken against the police as a result of policing major events.

**Public Order Measure 3 – To ensure that at least 85% of residents and businesses are satisfied with the information received in relation to pre-planned events**

- 3.12 **Reason:** The proposed measure demonstrates a high level of appropriate engagement with the community to assist dealing with impact of large scale events, including potential disorder.

For the purposes of this measure, an "event" is defined as one where multiple Police Support Units (PSU)<sup>5</sup> or serials are deployed and a "Bronze Community" is in place with a tactical plan to coordinate engagement with residents and businesses. This measure is carried forward from 2012-13, however, it has been increased from 80% to 85%.

- 3.13 **Baseline Information:** City of London businesses and residents were surveyed to ascertain the level of satisfaction with Force communications relating to the Queen's Diamond Jubilee (QDJ) arrangements. Marketing company Vocal Ltd of Colchester was commissioned to distribute the surveys and compile the results. Vocal used Survey Monkey and distributed the surveys to CoLP Business and Residents email group addresses on 18th June.

- 37 responses were received from residents, with 34 completing the overall satisfaction question.
- 181 responses were received from the business community, with 163 completing the overall satisfaction question.

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<sup>5</sup> A PSU consists of 1 inspector, 3 sergeants and 21 constables (6 per sergeant + 1 driver)

- **95.1%** (155 out of 163) of Business Community respondents answered very satisfied or satisfied to the question: “Overall, how satisfied were you with the information we sent you about the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee celebrations?”
- **91.2%** (31 out of 34) of Resident respondents answered very satisfied or satisfied to the same question.

3.14 iModus surveyed City of London businesses and residents in respect of the CoLP provision of information in relation to the 2012 Olympic & Paralympic Games. This survey was conducted during September 2012.

- 100 responses were received from the business community
- 25 responses were received from residents.
- Satisfaction levels for business respondents (100 returned) were **96%** which included 54% very satisfied with the information provided.
- Satisfaction levels for residents (25 returned) were **90%** including 60% very satisfied.

3.15 Based on levels achieved for 2012-13 the target is increased from 80% to 85%.

3.16 **How it will be measured:** Information will be gathered in the same way as currently, by UPD based on survey results from Vocal and iModus and reported to PMG monthly. However, over the coming months that may change due to ongoing work by the Intelligence and Information Directorate concerning community engagement.

## 4 Priority – Crime Reduction

### Reason for priority

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- 4.1 Crime reduction has been carried forward from 2012-13. It remains the case that in any survey where people are asked what they expect their local police to do, ‘reducing crime’ always features near to the top of the responses. Additionally, the Government’s sole ‘top down’ priority to police forces nationally is for them to reduce levels of crime.
- 4.2 Targeted operations and sustained activity in crime reduction has resulted in consistently reducing crime levels since 2002-3.
- 4.3 For 2012-13 the Force adopted a more focused approach that concentrated on the following two areas:
- Victim based violent crime, which is an area that impacts on people’s sense of security in the City and their confidence in it being a safe place; and
  - Victim based acquisitive crime, which includes the Force’s highest category of volume crime – theft.
- 4.4 The term “victim-based” was a new categorisation of crimes that had been agreed by the Home Office and ACPO. The key features of the categorisation are that:
- It distinguishes between four fundamental crime types: violence, stealing, criminal damage and non victim based crimes.
  - It avoids perverse incentives by separating victim based crimes from non victim based crimes.
  - It attempts, within the constraints of crime categories, to distinguish serious from less serious crimes.
- 4.5 Victim-based violent crime includes: violence against the person, with and without injury; rape and other sexual offences. It does not include s.4 and s.4 (a) Public Order Act offences (causing fear or provocation of violence and causing harassment, alarm or distress respectively, even though both are victim based). Nor does it include robbery (including assault with intent to rob), which are now included in the victim based acquisitive crime category, whereas previously all robbery was counted as violent crime.
- 4.6 Victim-based acquisitive crime includes: burglary (domestic and non-domestic), robbery (personal and business), vehicle crime (including interference), shoplifting and other categories of theft.
- 4.7 Having assessed crime performance across other categories of crime, these two areas continue to constitute the largest volume of crimes committed in the City and cover the most serious offences. It is, therefore, proposed to carry forward these targets for 2013-14. The recent trends in violent crime demonstrate that it will continue to be a challenge to achieve a straightforward reduction, as with acquisitive crime.

**Crime Reduction Measure 1 – To reduce levels of victim-based violent crime<sup>6</sup> compared to 2012-13**


4.8 **Reason:** This is an area of criminality that impacts on feeling of safety of communities and confidence in the City of London as safe place. Reducing crime across the range of crimes that constitutes this category will support the national requirement to reduce crime levels. (See **Appendix A** for categories of crimes covered).

4.9 **Baseline information**


**April – November 2012: 402 offences recorded** (April – November 2011: 368)

4.10 At the end of November 2012 the Force was 23 incidents above target. This is compared to +4 in October, +1 in September and -1 in August highlighting that achievement of the target is becoming more challenging. 63 crimes were recorded in November, the highest month of the year so far and any month in 2011/12.

4.11 Last year, December, February and March saw relatively high levels of violent crime recorded which could provide an opportunity for some reduction over the next four months. However, for the last two years the average of these months has been higher than the yearly average; if this is a seasonal trend it may not be possible to achieve sufficient reduction to meet the target.



<sup>6</sup> This relates to “victim based violent crime”, a distinct crime categorisation that incorporates violence against the person, with and without injury; rape and other sexual offences.



4.12 Trends based on between 6 months and 2 years data indicate that the Force will end the year above target at between 619 and 642 offences. A straightforward reduction on these figures remains a challenging target.

4.13 **How will it be measured and reported:** The data for crime statistics is well developed and in use. PIU will supply information monthly to PMG that will show current performance and year to date performance.

**Crime Reduction Measure 2 – To reduce levels of victim-based acquisitive crime<sup>7</sup> compared to 2012-13**


4.14 **Reason:** The crimes that constitute this category represent the greatest volume of crimes recorded by the Force. As with victim-based violent crime, a reduction in these crimes will support the government’s directive to reduce crime levels. Fewer resources mean that a straightforward reduction on 2012-13 levels remains challenging.

<sup>7</sup> This relates to victim based acquisitive crime

4.15 Crime categories included in this target and approximate numerical weighting:

Victim Based Acquisitive Crime	Offences Apr-Sep 2012	% of Victim Based Acquisitive Crime
Other Theft	922	48.2%
Theft from Shops	294	15.4%
Non domestic burglary	196	10.3%
Theft of pedal cycle	187	9.8%
Theft from the person	158	8.3%
Theft from a vehicle	63	3.3%
Theft of Motor Vehicle, inc. Agg Taking and Vehicle Interference (but not unauthorised driving of a vehicle from stolen outside Col)	31	1.6%
Robbery	19	1.0%
Theft by employee	13	0.7%
Domestic burglary	8	0.4%
Preserved other fraud	8	0.4%
Theft in dwelling	4	0.2%
Blackmail	4	0.2%
Theft from meter/machine	3	0.2%
Theft of mail	1	0.1%
Dishonest use of electricity	0	0.0%
	<b>1911</b>	<b>100%</b>

4.16 **Baseline Information:** April – November 2012: 2,533 offences recorded (April – November 2011: 2,781). At the end of November 2012 the Force has an 8.9% (-248) reduction in victim based acquisitive crime and is 6.2% (-167) below target. It is anticipated that the target will be met, with an end of year between a 6 and 10% reduction. The Force continues to see large reductions in shoplifting (-96), theft of pedal cycle (-120) and theft other (-36). Theft of vehicles has also fallen by 27 crimes.



- 4.17 312 crimes were recorded in November which is slightly higher than the same month last year (+6). An average of 379 crimes can be recorded per month to achieve an end of year crime reduction. This figure has not been exceeded in any month of the year so far. Acquisitive crime has been relatively low during the December and January for the past two years, so crime reduction during these months may be rather more challenging. However, this will not impact on overall achievement of the target.
- 4.18 **How will it be measured and reported:** The data for crime statistics is well developed and in use. PIU will supply information monthly to PMG that will show current performance and year to date performance.

## 5 Priority – Roads Policing

### Reason for priority

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- 5.1 Roads policing and road safety remains a recurring priority for residents and visitors to the City of London, as well as our partners in the City of London Corporation and Transport for London. Its inclusion as a Force priority supports those partnership obligations in addition to ACPO and Department for Transport national road policing and safety strategies. Very recently the issue has also taken on a national dimension, attracting much media attention. The number of people injured on roads in the City is significant, and whilst there are limits to what the Force can actually do to impact on those levels, it is right that roads policing remains a Force priority.

### Roads Policing Measure 1 – To support the City of London Corporation’s casualty reduction target through enforcement and education activities

- 5.2 **Reason:** The Force’s target in this area has traditionally been set around the number of Killed/Seriously Injured (KSI) people on the City’s roads. Levels of KSIs are relatively low and too low to indicate any meaningful trend analysis. There are no seasonal trends relating to people killed or seriously injured or for total collisions. The matter has been the subject of problem profiles and reports to SMB and PMG.
- 5.3 It is accepted that the Force can impact on the overall volume of collisions through a combination of education, enforcement and engineering. The Force has no control over what sort of injury might result from a collision, or its severity. It was for that principal reason that the target was amended last year from a KSI target to a collision reduction target. However, whilst the Force’s activities can impact on levels of collisions, to quantify that as a numerical target remains notoriously difficult. It is widely accepted that the responsibility to reduce the number of KSIs rests with the local authority and the most effective mechanism to deal with the issue is as a joint approach with partners. For that reason, the target proposed for 2013-14 is not a quantitative target but a ‘narrative’ target around supporting the City of London Corporation’s KSI and all casualty reduction targets. This will be underpinned by one or two tactical measures focussing on enforcement and education activities.



- 5.4 **Baseline Information: KSI TARGET** = The Corporation's KSI target is based on the following baseline: 247 people killed or seriously injured in the City in road traffic collisions between 2004 and 2008 (inclusive), an annual average of 49.4. The City Corporation's target is to reduce the number of persons killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions to a three-year rolling average of 39.1 casualties per annum by 2013, representing a reduction of 20.9% from the 2004-2008 average of 49.4 casualties per annum.
- 5.5 The City Corporation's longer-term target is to reduce the number of persons killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions to 50% below the 2004-2008 average by 2020, i.e., to a three-year rolling average of **24.7 casualties per annum by 2020**
- 5.6 **ALL CASUALTY TARGET** = There were 1,843 people injured in the City in road traffic collisions between 2004 and 2008 (inclusive), an annual average of 368.6. The City Corporation's target is to reduce the total number of persons injured in road traffic collisions to a three-year rolling average of 322.5 casualties per annum by 2013. This represents a reduction of 12.5% from the 2004-2008 average of 368.6 casualties per annum.
- 5.7 The City Corporation's longer-term target is to reduce the total number of persons injured in road traffic collisions to 30% below the 2004-2008 average by 2020, i.e., to a three-year rolling average of 258.0 casualties per annum by 2020.
- 5.8 **How it will be measured/reported:** The reporting against how the Force is achieving this target will consist of details of activities the Force has completed in support of the target (e.g. specific operations, recent ones have included Op Atrium, Op Giant (uninsured drivers), and an operation focussing on enforcement of dangerous loads legislation). This will be supported by quantitative tactical targets as below.

**Roads policing Measure 2– To increase the number of uninsured vehicles seized and unlicensed drivers apprehended compared to 2012-13**

- 5.9 **Reason:** By targeting uninsured and unlicensed vehicles and impounding them, the Force is reducing the potential risk of those vehicles being involved in incidents. It could also act as a deterrent to uninsured drivers travelling to or through the City of London. Those road users that are prepared to flout these laws are likely to engage in other criminality, and by targeting them the Force has an opportunity to make an impact on crime in general.

#### 5.10 Baseline Information:

Seizures	2011 – 12 (pro rata)	2012 – 13 to date	2012 – 13 projected
No Insurance	253 (169)	169	289
No D/L	125 (82)	69	118
Both	80 (59)	61	104
Total	458 (310)	299	511

5.11 The projection is calculated on the monthly average for the previous seven months being the number seized each month for the next 5 months. (The last 5 months of last year had a total of 148 whereas the projection for the next 5 months is 212 – the average is 42). We should increase the number by 5% for next year over the final figure for this year and include driving licence seizures as well.

5.12 **How it will be measured:** Data will be supplied to PMG monthly by UPD, reporting levels against a year to date target.

#### Roads Policing Measure 3: To increase the number of referrals to the Cycle Safe Scheme<sup>8</sup> and the Driver Alert Scheme compared to 2012-13

5.13 **Reason:** These initiatives both support the casualty reduction target and directs attention at irresponsible road use by cyclists, which continues to be a perennial issue raised by members of the public in consultation exercises, and drivers. They also support ACPO's and the Department of Transport's Strategy for Roads Policing, which seeks to divert those involved in poor road use away from prosecution and offers a longer term solution by improving behaviour of cyclists and drivers on the roads.

5.14 **BASELINE INFORMATION** (Cycle Safe)

**2011-12 Baseline = 128**

**Monthly profile = 74**

**Actual = 119**

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<sup>8</sup> The Capital Cycle Safe Scheme is an initiative that provides cyclists who have been apprehended for poor road use with an opportunity to be diverted from prosecution on to an education scheme rather than face prosecution or a £30 fixed penalty notice fine. This option is only available once in a three year period. If the course is not completed, the individual is issued with a summons for the original offence.

Month	Tickets issued 2011/2012	Course Completed 2011/2012	% completed 2011/2012	Profile	Tickets issued 2012/2013	Total	Total Courses Completed 2012/2013	% completed 2012/2013
Apr	16	13	81%	10.5	3	3		
May	16	12	75%	21	33	36		
Jun	9	2	22%	32	5	41		
Jul	6	5	83%	42	8	53		
Aug	5	3	60%	53	34	86		
Sep	19	14	74%	63	14	100		
Oct	9	2	22%	74	24	124	85	69%
Nov	19	9	47%	84	5	129	90	70%
Dec	11	3	27%	95				
Jan	4	1	25%	106				
Feb	6	2	33%	117				
Mar	8	8	100%	128				
	128	74	58%	128			-	

- 5.15 Current performance is running significantly above profile. A straightforward increase in the in the total (when known for the end of the year) will be a challenging target given the Force restructuring and the reduction in levels of resources.
- 5.16 **Baseline Information (Driver Alert)** The current number of drivers that have been referred to the scheme from May 2011 to September 2012 is 40. The end of year baseline will not be known until the end of the financial year
- 5.17 **How it will be measured:** Information will be supplied by UPD monthly to PMG in the format above but incorporating Driver Alert Referrals.

## 6 – ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR ASSOCIATED WITH THE NIGHT TIME ECONOMY


### Reason for priority

6.1 The Force's Strategic Assessment highlights antisocial behaviour (particularly that associated with the night time economy) as a significant issue. It remains an issue that is high on the government's agenda, and is a recurring theme in surveys and community engagement events. It also remains a priority for the Safer City Partnership. Antisocial behaviour has been adopted by the Force as a discrete priority for the first time for 2013-14.

**ASB measure 1 – To ensure that at least 90% or more crime victims and those reporting antisocial behaviour are satisfied with the way police handled their case.**

6.2 **Reason:** Satisfaction with the Force of how it handles the cases of victims of crime and antisocial behaviour is an important indication of the quality and professionalism of the service provided. Comments made as part of the surveys provides the Force with invaluable information about how service delivery can be improved.

6.3 **Baseline Information:** The 2012-13 Policing Plan target of 85% was based on all the overall satisfaction of all victims/witnesses of ASB that were surveyed. At the end of 2011/12 the satisfaction level was 92.3% (220 respondents). So far this year (Apr – Sep) the satisfaction level is 93.2% (90 respondents). It is proposed, therefore, to increase the target to 90% for 2013-14.



Since July 2011 quarterly satisfaction levels have consistently been above 90%.

A relatively low number of people are surveyed on a 12 month period (192) and only a few of these individuals express dissatisfaction (13).

This target is easily being met by CoLP.

6.4 **How it will be measured/reported:** Data will be supplied by PIU quarterly following surveys having been conducted.

**ASB measure 2 – To reduce the average annual number of rough sleepers in the City of London**

6.5 **Reason:** This supports the City of London Corporation’s target to reduce the level ultimately to zero. It also supports Safer City Partnership targets in this area.

6.6 **Baseline Information:** 2011-12

Area	Feb 11	Mar 11	Apr 11	May 11	Jul 11	Aug 11	Sep 11	Oct 11	Nov 11	Dec 11	Jan 12	Mar 12
Fleet Street	5	2	1	4	2	3	3	2	2	2	3	1
Barts	2	0	0	3	0	2	2	2	2	2	3	5
St. Paul’s	5	2	2	1	6	5	3	4	4	5	6	3
Barbican	3	5	5	3	3	3	5	9	6	2	6	6
Liverp’l St	0	2	2	3	5	4	1	1	0	0	1	0
Aldgate	7	5	5	6	1	1	3	1	3	3	1	9
Cannon St	0	2	2	2	0	1	1	4	1	2	3	11
Tower Hill	1	2	2	0	5	1	7	3	1	3	2	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>39</b>

**Apr 2012 to date**

Area	Apr 12	May 12	Jun 12	Jul 12	Aug 12	Sep 12	Oct 12	Nov 12
Fleet Street	3	3	5	2	1	0	3	5
Barts	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
St. Paul’s	4	6	6	3	6	1	3	5
Barbican	6	3	3	8	3	5	2	2
Liverp’l St	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Aldgate	4	3	0	2	0	1	1	2
Cannon St	9	4	3	3	3	2	6	4
Tower Hill	4	3	0	1	0	4	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>21</b>

- 6.7 The “spike” in numbers of rough sleepers recorded for March and April 2012 was due to Op Poncho (the operation that works to reduce numbers of rough sleepers) being withdrawn. This is evidence that the Force can impact on levels of rough sleepers, however, it is also clear that even with the operation running, there is a fairly constant number of people sleeping rough in the City that ranges from between 15 and 25. The proposal is to reduce the number of people sleeping rough in the City based on a baseline of 20, being the average number of the past 20 months disregarding the two abnormally high months..
- 6.8 **How it will be measured/reported:** Data will be supplied by UPD monthly to PMG against a profiled target.

**ASB measure 3 – To actively promote, with partners, effective stewardship and crime prevention activities within licensed premises**

- 6.9 **Reason:** Anti Social behaviour associated with the NTE can have a disastrous effect on surrounding communities and the infrastructure that supports them. Local residents who are victims of crime (both actual and potential) incur costs both in anticipation (e.g alarm systems/ security measures) and as a consequence (property damaged/stolen/noise pollution/personal injury etc ) the fear of crime can reduce peoples quality of life and enjoyment. There are extra costs associated with healthcare, criminal justice system, policing, street cleansing, environmental health, fire etc. This will be amplified over the coming months as Uniformed Policing notices a drop in available resources to be able to deal with the cycle of responding and enforcing action; hence it is important that the Police engages positively alongside the local authority and partners with the licensees in order to mitigate risks and recommend measures as appropriate to prevent offending within licensed premises.
- 6.10 **Baseline Information:** Three simplified categories (Personal, Nuisance, and Environmental) were introduced in April 2012, reducing the number of categories from the original 14. This was intended to change the emphasis from merely recording and responding to incidents to identifying those vulnerable individuals, communities and environments most at risk and responding appropriately.

The three categories are explained as follows:

**Personal**

Incidents that are deliberately targeted, or aimed at having an impact, on a particular individual or specific group - rather than the community at large. This would include incidents such as begging or trespass.

**Nuisance**

Incidents where an individual or group causes trouble, annoyance, inconvenience, offence or suffering to people in the local community in general, rather than being

deliberately targeted at specific individuals or groups; Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour are categorised under Nuisance.

### **Environmental**

This category deals with the interface between people and places. It includes incidents and inconsiderate actions which have an impact on the surroundings including natural, built and social environments. Fly tipping, graffiti or noise would be categorised under environmental.

In the previous year (Nov 11 to Oct 12) incidents were categorised as follows:

- ASB – Environmental - 86
- ASB – Nuisance – 1339
- ASB – Personal – 192
- 

This would indicate that in the City of London the most prominent type of ASB is not directed at individual persons, but is instead behaviours which cause a more general annoyance to the whole community.

Rowdy / Inconsiderate Behaviour continues to be the most prevalent type of ASB in the City and accounts for **64%** of all ASB incidents.

- 6.11 **How it will be measured/reported:** There were 11 prosecutions last year by the licensing authority for a number of wide ranging infringements. It not proposed that this figure alone be representative of success in this area as we are looking to achieve a reduction in overall offending and prevention of anti social and criminal behaviour, but it will be important to monitor the level of enforcement activity, and its effect on preventing both crime and antisocial behaviour, along with any predicted displacement to other venues. Licensing visits are already a regular feature of targeted police activity along with partnership operations driven through the licensing tactical group, chaired by the Supt Community Engagement and working with the Director of Public protection The City of London Police to continue to work alongside the Safer City Partnership , Licensing authority, Broadway, Parking Services, Housing Services, Environmental Health and other Corporation Departments to ensure that ASB in the City is effectively managed and prevented in the future. These joint operations are resource intensive and challenging to coordinate, however 3 to 5 joint agency operations being run throughout the year is a realistic target. Additionally Regular licensed premises visits number on average approximately 20 per week.

All licensing activity is monitored at the fortnightly partnership licensing tactical group and subsequently reported to PMG.

Additional preventative measures will also include:

Fixed penalty tickets for urination in public places, covered under section 87 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990; this is new and fairly groundbreaking. Numbers will be collated and reported to PMG.

**ASB measure 4 – To run intelligence led operations to target threats associated with the night time economy.**

6.12 **Reason:** Licensed premises in the City of London have a host of associated crime and ASB issues, often caused by individuals who are known to the criminal justice system. Gangs are a significant driver for a range of criminal activity, ranging from drug supply, knife crime, serious violence through to firearms offences and murder. In addition to the serious criminality posed by organised gangs in London, the emergence of violent youth gangs also poses specific challenges around serious youth violence, street robberies and anti-social behaviour. In most of the cases intelligence reports regarding persons involved with London Street Gangs (LSG) and firearms criminality revolve around promoted music events held in the City.

6.13 **Baseline Information:** Analysis of violent crime trends over the past 3 years has found that serious violent offences have increased, and in particular the instance of these in the early hours of Sunday morning. This rise in offences, and their location correlates with the rise in Promoted Events being held in the City. Promoted events are most often held on a Saturday night, with closing times peaking at 04:00 on Sunday. It has been suggested that the City is experiencing a displacement of gang related promoted events as a result of proactive work targeting clubs within the MPS. This could increase the risk of gang related violence in the City.

The numbers of offences that occur within licensed premises, generally public houses and night clubs during NTE hours is 10% of all offences in licensed premises. The number of offences that occur during the hours of the NTE is 243 offences out of 402 offences, or 60.4%. (third quartile figures).

6.14 **How it will be measured/reported:** FIB will continue to engage with partner law enforcement agencies to ensure that we are in possession of all relevant material held on databases in relation to current gangs and their members which present the greatest risk of harm to the City of London, our clubs and its patrons.

Target offenders by maximising use of tactics such as CCTV and ANPR to identify and predict violent activity at an early stage. We will run regular pre planned pro-active ANPR triggered operations to identify the vehicles of known individuals that Intelligence suggests are involved in criminality including drugs supply and violence. Our assets will be used in order to stop these vehicles where appropriate and take appropriate positive action, disrupting and preventing criminality.

We will continue to implement high visibility patrols during peak hours of the NTE in identified hotspot areas and direct policing activity against identified emerging trends.



Ensure Cross Directorate Violent Crime Reduction Plan is implemented via Force Tasking processes and Daily Management Meeting in order to identify strong enforcement and prevention opportunities.

Undertake regular, high profile licensing visits to premises where violent crimes have occurred.


Engage with partners, such as the Safer City Partnership (Safety Thirst Programme) and Night Time Economy Group, to develop tactical solutions to reduce criminal opportunities.

Implement intervention measures relating to promoted events in the force, particularly in cases where there is intelligence to suggest an elevated risk of harm, or where there is a previous history of violence or disorder. It will be reported to PMG monthly.

## 7. OTHER MEASURES


**Satisfaction measure – To ensure that at least 85% of the City’s street population surveyed consider the police in the City of London are doing a good or excellent job**

- 7.1 **Reason:** Unlike the previous measure, this survey indicates levels of confidence amongst the general street population, not just those who have been a victim of crime or antisocial behaviour. However, as the previous measure, it is an invaluable indication of the level of professionalism the Force portrays and provides.
- 7.2 **Baseline Information: Victims of Crime – All Victims -** The current Policing Plan target of 85% was based on all the overall satisfaction of all victims of crime that were surveyed. At the end of 2011/12 the satisfaction level was 88.0% (913 respondents). So far this year (Apr – Sep) the satisfaction level is 87.6% (348 respondents). (See next page). However, at the workshop on the 18<sup>th</sup> January Members elected to keep the target as 85% for 2013/14.



7.3 On a quarterly basis, satisfaction levels tend to be between 85-90%. These levels need to remain constant if the satisfaction level seen in 2011/12 is to be matched. CoLP are on track to meet the 85% target. The 12 rolling month satisfaction figures have dropped from those seen 2 year ago. Areas of lower satisfaction are often that victims are not satisfied with the course of action taken or being kept informed.

7.4 **Victims of Crime – ADR Categories** - the Home Office collates and publishes the satisfaction levels of victims of Violence, Domestic Burglary and Vehicle Crime. CoLP’s crime figures for these categories are low and therefore percentages can be disproportionately affected. At the end of 2011/12 the satisfaction level was 85.3% (174 respondents). So far this year (Apr – Sep) the satisfaction level is 75.0% (75 respondents). In the last 12 rolling month period there have been 137 respondents. Of these 3 were victims of Domestic Burglary, 86 of violence and 48 of vehicle crime.




7.5 The 12 rolling month figure has dropped due to lower satisfaction levels between Oct 11 – Mar 12. The higher levels seen at the beginning of 2011 are also no longer included in the 12 month total. This is due to lower levels of satisfaction for victims of vehicle crime. However these levels have increased over the past two quarters. If satisfaction levels continue at the same level seen in the previous two quarters the 12 rolling month total will have increase by the end of the March 2013.

7.6 **How it will be measured / reported:** Information will be supplied quarterly by PIU to PMG following completion of street surveys.

**Response measure 1: To respond to at least 95% of 999 calls within the national response target of 12 minutes**

7.7 **Reason:** It is important that when someone calls for emergency assistance the response is swift and professional. This target provides an opportunity to boost public confidence by highlighting how quickly calls for service are attended. With reductions to the levels of resources being implemented over the course of the policing plan, it is not proposed to increase this target.

7.8 **Baseline Information:** 1190 out of 1221 (97.5%) of incidents in the City that were graded for immediate response were attended within 12 minutes. The response rate for November was 97.2% (140 out of 144 incidents). Over the last 12 months the Force has consistently achieved this target.



7.9 **How it will be measured/reported:** data will be supplied by PIU to PMG monthly in the format above.

APPENDIX A

**VICTIM BASED VIOLENCE and VICTIM BASED ACQUISITIVE CRIMES**

<b>Violence with injury</b>	Murder		<b>Sexual Offences</b>	Rape
	Attempted Murder			Indecent / Sexual assault
	Causing death by dangerous driving			Sexual activity involving a child
	Actual Bodily Harm and other Injury			Exposure and Voyeurism
			<b>Robbery</b>	Robbery of personal property
	Racially/Religiously Aggravated Actual Bodily Harm			Robbery of business property
	Wounding		<b>Burglary Dwelling</b>	Burglary in a dwelling
	Manslaughter		<b>Burglary Non-Dwelling</b>	Burglary in a building other than a dwelling
	Assault with injury		<b>Vehicle Crime</b>	Aggravated vehicle taking
	Inflicting Grievous Bodily Harm without Intent			Theft or unauthorised taking of vehicle
	Racially or Religiously Agg Assault with Injury			Theft from a vehicle
	Interfering with a Motor Vehicle			
<b>Violence without injury</b>	Harassment		<b>Shoplifting</b>	Shoplifting
	Racially or Religiously Aggravated Harassment		<b>Other Acquisitive Crime</b>	Theft from the person
	Threats to Kill			Theft in a dwelling
	Kidnapping			Theft or unauthorised taking of a cycle
	Child Cruelty			Other theft
	Child abduction			Blackmail
	Assault without Injury			Theft by an employee
	Racially/Religiously Agg Assault without Injury			Theft of mail
	Assault without Injury on a Constable			Theft from automatic machine or meter
	Endangering Life			Fraud other than Cheque and Credit card

VICTIM BASED CRIMES NOT INCLUDED IN POLICING PLAN TARGETS			
<b>Criminal Damage</b>	Arson endangering life		Possession of Firearms w. intent
	Arson not endangering life		Possession of Firearms Offences
	Criminal damage to a dwelling		Possession of Article with Blade or Point
	Criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling		Possession of Other weapons
	Criminal damage to a Vehicle		Going equipped for stealing
	Other criminal damage		Possess/Control Articles for Use in Frauds
	Racially/Religiously Agg Other Criminal Damage		Handling stolen goods
	Racially/Religiously Agg Crim Dam to a Building other than a Dwelling		Threat or possession with intent to commit Criminal damage
<b>Public Disorder</b>	Public Fear, Alarm or Distress		Poss/Control A False/Improperly Obtained/Another Person's Identity Document
	Racially/Religiously Agg Public Fear, Alarm or Distress		Possess/Control Identity Documents w. intent
	Other Offences against the State and public order		Bankruptcy and insolvency
	Violent disorder		Perjury
<b>Drugs</b>	Trafficking in controlled drugs		Perverting the Course of Justice
	Other Drug Offences		Obscene Publications etc
	Possession of Controlled Drugs (exc.cannabis)		Disclosure, Obstruction, False or Misleading Statements
	Possession of Controlled Drugs (cannabis)		Dangerous driving
			<b>Offences against Statute</b>
			Vehicle/driver document fraud
			Exploitation of Prostitution
			Profiting from or Concealing Knowledge of the Proceeds of Crime
			Making or Supplying Articles for Use in Frauds
			Bigamy

**VICTIM OR STATUTE (GROUPING MAY CHANGE FOR NFIB)**

<b>Excluded Fraud</b>	Frauds by company directors etc.
	Fraudulent Trading by Sole Trader
	False accounting
	Fraud by False Representation - cheque, plastic card and online accounts
	Fraud by False Representation - Other Fraud
	Fraud by Failing to Disclose Information
	Fraud by Abuse of Position
	Other forgery
	Cheque and Credit card fraud
	Obtaining Services Dishonestly
	Forgery or use of false drug prescription